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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-PRIVATE PossEssiolT OF OBSCENE MATERIALS.
Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969).
Robert E. Stanley's home was searched by federal and state agents
pursuant to a valid search warrant issued by a United States Commis-
sioner.' The warrant authorized the agents to search for equipment
used in bookmaking activities. Though little such evidence was found,
the agents did discover three rolls of obscene film in a desk drawer in
Stanley's bedroom. After viewing the film, the agents arrested the
accused for possession of contraband obscene matter in violation of
Georgia law 2 Following conviction by a jury, Stanley appealed to the
Supreme Court of Georgia which upheld the conviction.3 In reversing
the conviction on appeal,4 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that "mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally
be made a crime." r
Employing the first amendment of the Constitution of the United
States' as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment,7 the Su-
preme Court established that a state may not interfere with what one
reads or views in the privacy of his own home. The holding of the Court
in no way conflicts with the mainstream of cases denying first amend-
1. The agents were lawfully present m Stanley's home and empowered to search
for the items specified m the warrant; the warrant included no authority to search for
or seize obscene matter. Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1251 (1969).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny
person . who shall knowingly have possession of any obscene matter shall
be guilty of a felony "
3. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
4. The appeal from the Supreme Court of Georgia to the Supreme Court of the
United States was taken in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1964) which permits
appeal from judgments of the highest court of a state "where [there] is drawn in question
the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
Stanley claimed that GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968) was violative of his first
amendment rights, and therefore unconstitutional, in so far as it punished private
possession of obscene material.
5. Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. at 1245n.3.
6. "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press 20
7. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States "
[261]
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ment protection to obscemty s because of the fact situation presented
here9 and the narrow issue thereby raised for the Court's consideraon. 1°
The tenor of the opinion is made manifest by the statement that "what-
ever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscemty, we
do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home." 1 Accord-
ingly, the decision provides rio basis for attacks upon statutes prohibiting
the sale or distribution of obscene matter 12 or the sending of such mat-
ter through the mails.18 Nor does Stanley cast doubt upon the validity
of laws prohibiting possession of other types of items not -covered -by
the first amendment such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods. Where
national security is involved, this case has no applicability even to print-
ed, recorded, or filmed materials.14
As so frequently has been the case in the recent past, in Stanley the
Supreme Court has strengthened and sought to preserve the rights of the
individual against encroachment by the state. This approach of the
majority decision was buttressed by a concurring opinion which would
have suppressed the evidence in the first instance as having been seized
in violation of the fourth amendment. 5
This logical, restrained ruling is a finely tempered exercise of judicial
8. Building upon its decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US. 568 (1942),
the Supreme Court ruled m Roth v. Umted States, 354 US. 476, 485 (1957), that
"obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." But
the Roth case dealt with publication and sale of obscemty as did Roth's progeny,
with certain variations. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US. 629 (1968) (involving
sale of obscene matter to minors).
The question of possession of obscene matter in the privacy of one's own home
bad not been before the Court for determination prior to the Stanley case, although
as noted by the Court, 89 S. Ct. at 1245 n.3, the issue was before the Court in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961), but that case was decided on other grounds.
9. Whether the materials seized from Stanley's bedroom were obscene was not
argued. The Court reached its decision under the assumption that they constituted
obscenity 89 S.Ct. 1244 n.2. The defendant had been convicted of knowingly possessing
obscene material; there were no facts leading to an inference that he was a distributor,
that he had mailed obscene material, or that he had circulated it in any other manner.
Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968).
10. The issue was whether a state may prohibit an individual's possession of obscene
books for his own use in the privacv of his own home.
11. 89 S. Ct. at 1248.
12. 89 S. Ct. at 1249 n.11.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White concurred because the agents, having a
lawful and valid warrant to search for gambling equipment exceeded their authority by
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prudence, for even while reaffirming the privacy and inviolability of an
individuals home and his right to read or view what he pleases thereto,
the Court did nothing which might denigrate the rights of the public
or inhibit the police power to enforce other statutory provisions re-
garding obscenity '
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Labor Law-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER REQUIRING
PAYMENT OF FRINGE BENEFITS. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
The respondent was a member of the Roofers Contractors' Association,
a multi-employer association through which a contract with the roofer's
union was in effect from August 1960, to August 1963.1 He fulfilled all
of his obligations under tis contract. A new agreement was then ne-
gotiated for 1963-1967 which the respondent refused to acknowledge.2
seizing the obscene films, matter of which no mention had been made in the warrant.
This was a clear violation of the fourth amendment provision that no "warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Citing
Marron v. United States, 275 U.. 192 (1927), emphasis was given to the fact that
an officer has no discretion when searching under authority of a warrant describing
one item to seize another item. It was further noted that since Stanley was not
under arrest at the time, this was not a case of a search and seizure incident to arrest.
89 S. Ct. at 1251.
16. Anticipating that an argument might be raised that statutes prohibiting possession
are necessary and complementary to those prohibiting sale and distribution, i.e., without
such statutes untold difficulties in proving intent to distribute or of accumulating evi-
dence of distribution would result, the Court recalled that in Smith v. California, 361 US.
147, 155 (1959), a similar argument had been held insufficient to justify abuse of in-
dividual rights. While unconvinced that such difficulties will result from this decision,
the Court said that "even if they did they would [not] justify infringement of the
individual's right to read or observe what he pleases." 89 S. Ct. at 1243.
1. The contract was negotiated by the Roofers Local 36, United Slate, Tile, &
Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Association and the Roofers
Contractors' Association, of which the respondent had been a member since 1949.
Joseph T. Strong, 152 N.L.R.B. 9, 10 (1965).
2. Id. Strong originally contended that since he had withdrawn from the Associa-
tion, he was not bound by the contract which it negotiated. So long as appropriately
timed, such withdrawal from a multi-employer association has been acknowledged by
the Board. See, e.g., Seattle Automotive Wholesalers Ass'n, 140 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1963);
Cooks Local 327, 131 N.L.R.B. 198 (1961). However, an attempt to withdraw is not
appropriately timed, and is therefore invalid, if made after the negotiation of a con-
tract by the association on the employer's behalf. NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co.,
281 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960); Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965); Cooke &
Jones, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1664 (1964); Fairbanks Dairy, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964).
In Retail Assoc's., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958), the Board held that when
